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individual obligations. Critics of the union shop would do well
to remember that federal law compels every union that legally
represents the majority of the employees in a valid bargaining
unit to expend its time and money to obtain and retain rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment and conditions of work for em-
ployees working under the contract who will not join the union
in equality with those who have joined the union. Why can it be
said that it is unjust or inequitable to legally force and compel
those same non-union employees to at least offer to bear a fair
share of the cost of maintenance of the union that must work for
all alike?
In the last analysis, the controversy centering around right-
to-work legislation resolves itself into the problem of balancing
conflicting rights. Those reasonable restraints on the rights of
liberty and property that the common weal and general welfare
demand include the union shop. The author submits that the
right-to-work legislation is a wholly arbitrary and ineffective
deterrant to whatever monopolistic activities that organized labor
may be guilty of practicing. The author further submits that
unions should not be compelled to expend their time and money
for the benefit of non-union employees without the correlative
right of contribution from those who refuse to join their ranks
through either justifiable principle or dogged recalcitrance.
The unalienable right to work cannot be found in either the
natural law of our social, economic, and political web or the con-
stitutional and legislative canons that theoretically reflect the
mores of the citizenry. Some who in the not so distant past were
quick to tread upon the hand and spirit of the laboring man sud-
denly feel the clarion call to rescue him from the tentacles of the
one institution that has so effectively espoused his cause. Some
more cynical than the author might suspect that their motives
are not entirely charitable.
CASE COMMENTS
LABOR LAW: DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYER BE-
CA.USE OF UNION ACTIVITY-The ruling of the Colorado In-
dustrial Commission, which was upheld by the district court, was
affirmed by the Supreme Court when it ordered Bennett's Restau-
rant to offer reemployment and compensation for financial loss
to four waitresses who were discharged in violation of the Colo-
rado Labor Peace act.' The court ruled that the waitresses were
selected for discharge because of their union activity and to in-
timidate other employees from joining the union.
Bennett's Restaurant v. Industrial Commission, (March 23, 1953) Colorado
Bar Association Advance Sheet for March 28, 1953.
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Petitioner claimed his reason for discontinuing the breakfast
shift and firing four waitresses was to reduce business expense.
The Industrial Commission did not decide on this issue, but the
Supreme Court accepted it as true. The primary question decided
was whether petitioner selected the four waitresses to be dis-
charged on some legitimate ground, such as incompetence, or be-
cause they joined the Hotel and Restaurant Employees union,
A. F. of L.
The facts of the case make it fairly obvious that the four
waitresses were discharged for their union activity. They were
the only four who signed union cards when the union organizer
visited the restaurant, and they talked to other employees urging
them to join. The manager's assertion that they were discharged
because of discontinuance of the breakfast shift was refuted by
a showing that one of the women fired was on the afternoon
shift two women on the breakfast shift were retained, and other
waitresses were hired before and after the firing.
Petitioner also claimed that a list was made of "outstanding"
waitresses and none of the waitresses fired was on that list. How-
ever, this claim lost weight when the manager admitted that
some waitresses who were on the "outstanding" list had been
working for Bennett's less than a week, before their competence
could be determined.
The Colorado Labor Peace act 2 provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
individually or in concert with others: to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization, em-
ployee agency, committee, association or representation
plan by discrimination in regard to hiring, tenure or
other terms or conditions of employment. ..
Subsections 7 and 8 of Section 8 provide that when the -commis-
sion's order is reviewed by a district court "The findings of fact
made by the Commission, if supported by creditable and com-
petent-evidence in the record, shall be conclusive." It is the prov-
ince of the commission and not of the court to determine the
weight to be accorded to the evidence.
For the rule of evidence to be applied in labor cases heard
before commissions, the Supreme Court cites 56 C.J.S. 307, Sec-
tion 28 (100)
In ascertaining whether an employee was discharged
because of union activities the board may consider cir-
cumstantial, as well as direct, evidence, but when circum-
stantial evidence is relied on there must be evidence of
circumstances from which the board may conclude with
reasonable certainty that the employee was discharged
because of union activity. The board may draw infer-
"-Colo. Laws, chap. 131, sec. 6, p. 400 (1943).
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ences from the facts proved. The fact that some of the
evidence relating to a discriminatory discharge was hear-
say affords no basis for objecting to the finding of the
board. However, mere suspicions or conjecture alone is
not sufficient on which to base a finding of discrimina-
tory discharge.
The district and Supreme Courts held that the findings of the
commission, that petitioner discriminated against employees who
sought unionization for the restaurant, were supported by "credit-
able and competent evidence" even though it was circumstantial.
Interpreting the Colorado Labor Peace act, the court quotes
language from N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation :3
The act (NLRA) does not interfere with the normal
exercise of the right of the employer to select its em-
ployees or to discharge them. The employer may not,
under cover of that right, intimidate or coerce its em-
ployees with respect to their self-organization and repre-
sentation and, on the other hand, the Board is not en-
titled to make its authority a pretext for interference
with the right of discharge when that right is exercised
for other reasons than such intimidation and coercion.
This case appears to be the first decision by the Colorado
Supreme Court interpreting the Colorado Labor Peace Act on
the issue of whether circumstantial evidence is admissible to prove
that an employee was discharged for his union activity.
The case points up how far labor unions have progressed in
Colorado in their efforts to win recognition since the early 1900's
when violence dominated the coal fields of Southern Colorado
when the United Mine Workers sought to unionize the mines. The
unions first achieved recognition after the strikes of 1914 when
the Rockefeller plan was put into effect in all Colorado Fuel and
Iron Company mines. The company reserved the right to hire
and fire "with fairness of the action subject to review," but it
was agreed that union membership was not a reason for refusing
a miner employment or discharging him. 4
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1301 U.S. 1 (1937).
4 Out of the Depths by Barron B. Beshoar (1942).
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